Lateral Intent Error’s Impact on Aircraft Prediction

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Abstract— Unprecedented global initiatives have begun to redesign the aviation systems that provide for the efficient and safe transport of civilian aircraft. Success of these initiatives is only possible through global collaborations that allow broader analyses and data to be shared. The paper reports on just such a study that examines the lateral deviations from the automation’s known horizontal route of flight to the actual aircraft position. These errors are due to the typical navigation and surveillance errors, as well as the larger atypical errors that are mainly caused by purposeful changes in the route of flight that are not updated. Large data analyses within the ground automation systems of the United States and Europe indicated errors from 20 to 30 nautical miles are common, while airborne Australian and more samples in the United States had errors from 100 to 800 times smaller. Further analysis illustrated the direct impact these errors have on safety critical separation management functions. It was concluded that airborne derived data via Automatic Dependent Surveillance Contract reports offer a major opportunity to improve the ground-based automation functions.

Keywords— aircraft intent; lateral deviation; trajectory prediction; conflict prediction; conflict probe; aviation automation; ADS-C

I. INTRODUCTION

Despite the current economic slow down, most air traffic service providers (ATSPs) across the globe continue to expect significant growth in air traffic demand in the future. If no action is taken, it is generally accepted that this growth will outpace the capacity limits of their aviation systems, resulting in greater congestion and inefficiency. In areas of the northeastern United States as well as Western Europe, these conditions may already have reached their capacity limits under peak demand. In unprecedented proportions, industry and ATSPs have responded by developing comprehensive plans requiring broad advances in ground-based and airborne automation.

The interagency Joint Development Planning Office (JPDO) in the United States foresees a traffic demand increase by 2025 up to three times the number of flights of today’s traffic [1]. The JPDO, as established in their charter under the “Vision-100” legislation (Public Law 108-176) signed by President G. W. Bush in December 2003, has mandated a next generation operational concept of the National Airspace System (NAS) for 2025 [1]. This next generation NAS envisions a trajectory based separation management system that requires precise management of the aircraft’s current and future position. The separation function of today, relying heavily on the cognitive skills of the air traffic controller to visualize aircraft trajectories on the radar display and issue resolutions via voice instructions to pilots, will be replaced by a distributed system of separation management components, implementing performance-based separation standards. This future system will rely heavily on enhanced automation with conflict resolutions that are communicated digitally between air and ground and between aircraft.

Beginning in July 2004, the European Commission established a consortium of air traffic stakeholders with similar objectives for Europe, known as the Single European Sky Air Traffic Management (ATM) Research Initiative (SESAR). SESAR requires development of technology, standards, and procedures over the next eight years. The overall objective is to increase air traffic capacity by three while cutting aviation costs in half, improving safety by a factor of ten, and reducing the environmental impact of each flight by ten percent [2].

While the initiatives in Europe and the United States were still just discussions among aviation stakeholders, Australia embarked on a world first initiative to develop an ATM Strategic Plan as early as 1999. Like the US and European plans that followed, it recognized that future operating efficiencies and increased freedom of use of airspace would be achieved using systems that require the cooperation of multiple aviation stakeholders. The plan set a 15+ year path for the future development of ATM in Australia. It highlights Australia’s commitment to the implementation of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) concept and global plan for ATM. Based on collaborative approach with User Preferred Trajectories as the ultimate goal; the ATM Strategic Plan establishes a framework that enables Australia to
keep at the forefront of the Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance (CNS) systems and ATM development and its associated benefits.

The successful achievement of these ambitious initiatives set forth by multiple nations will require researchers across the globe to question their old paradigms within the existing processes and infrastructure to develop new approaches for meeting the challenges in these plans. With such high goals, there will be increasing demands in schedule and cost (doing more with less) so collaboration is vital to leverage resources and expertise. This paper brings researchers together from the United States, Europe, and Australia to examine one specific, yet critical component within the aviation system – the understanding of the impact of lateral intent information within our current ATM automation and how it may improve in the future. The lateral intent of an aircraft is indeed only one aspect of the trajectory input information required to predict an aircraft’s future path but the challenges involved is a common problem across the globe. Therefore, global collaboration on the issues and potential solutions is warranted. This paper will first describe the trajectory prediction process followed by detailed explanations of the problem of missing lateral intent. Data and analysis results are presented in the next two sections that illustrate the magnitude of the problem. In closure, potential solutions are proposed.

II. AIRCRAFT TRAJECTORY PREDICTION PROCESS

Many of the operational concepts among the JPDO, SESAR, and Australia’s ATM Strategic Plan promote the development of decision support tools (DSTs). These tools are envisioned to help mitigate many of the capacity and workload constraints of the system if effectively integrated with advanced automation solutions in the air and ground systems. These tools have many purposes and typically serve to reduce the cognitive workload of the airspace problems faced by the current human decision makers operating the system. They include tools that serve to predict future conflicts between aircraft, both for ground based controllers or airborne pilots, allowing more strategic separation management of aircraft. Air traffic management DSTs include capabilities that forecast where and when traffic workload would stress the system, allowing air traffic supervisors to make more efficient adjustments to either avoid the condition or alter staff and/or airspace accordingly. Such tools also include air traffic metering tools to efficiently sequence aircraft into en route and arrival flows, maximizing the capacity of the system. A common thread in all these DSTs is the accurate and timely modeling of the aircraft’s current state and anticipated future path. This modeling function is referred to as the trajectory predictor (TP) process.

Figure 1 illustrates an example of the trajectory prediction process as applied to a commercial flight already en route. This example refers to a generic ground-based trajectory prediction and generation process; some TPs may require more, different or less information. The notional trajectory presented illustrates a simplistic trajectory prediction. A more complex instantiation of this process could lead to the inclusion of more sophisticated steps such as intent inferencing, in-flight parameter estimation, or trajectory error monitoring, and recalculation. The TP requires access to the flight plan containing the flight number (e.g., AAA123), the aircraft type (B-757-200), the filed cruise speed (true airspeed of 450 knots), the desired cruise altitude (31,000 feet), and the route of flight (from waypoint XXX, direct to ABC, then DEF, finally to XYZ via the BUC 7 STAR). Furthermore, the TP will have an estimate of the initial condition (current aircraft position, altitude, ground speed and ground track). Prior to conducting trajectory prediction, the flight plan route, expressed as named waypoints, jet routes, STARs, etc. will be converted to a series of geographical points (e.g., latitude and longitude). This process is known as route conversion [3].

Once the route is converted, a mechanism for joining the initial condition to the converted route is required. This process is referred to as lateral path initialization. This process may simply involve the identification of the initial location on the route. At times, the initial condition will be slightly off-route and some connection from the initial condition to the route will be required. A more generalized form of this trajectory service includes lateral intent modeling, in which larger portions of the lateral path may need to be generated based on assumed pilot or controller procedure.

Figure 1. Trajectory Generation – Adapted from [3]

Once the lateral path is determined, vertical and speed constraints must be considered at different points along the route of flight. This is the process of constraint specification. For example, speed constraints below 10,000 feet can be applied, as can altitude constraints along a standard terminal arrival route. The concept of longitudinal intent modeling, while implicit in some TPs, refers to the addition of speed and altitude procedural considerations that reflect how the combined controller, pilot and aircraft guidance system will “fly” the aircraft. An example is the estimation of the top-of-descent location or the planned descent speed.

All of the above steps must be conducted prior to the calculation of a trajectory using physics-based modeling. We refer to this collection of information as the preparation process. The core part of aircraft trajectory prediction follows as the next step. In this part, the lateral and vertical path is computed to “reflect” the predicted behavior identified in the preparation process, including: following the converted route, meeting specified constraints (such as altitude and speed constraints), following appropriate aircraft dynamics (such as turns, climbs and descents), and reflecting environmental and aircraft-specific effects. The output of this process is the 4-dimensional trajectory that defines predicted future states of the aircraft expressed as a function of time.
III. PROBLEM OF MISSING LATERAL INTENT

The accuracy of the TP process described above can be measured by post flight comparisons of predicted and observed aircraft trajectories. Since the predicted trajectory is the fundamental input that sustains the DST’s capabilities and functions, the accuracy of the TP has a direct and significant impact on the DST’s overall performance and usability.

In addition to those previously described, the TP requires many inputs to produce an accurate trajectory prediction such as aircraft model characteristics, surveillance position reports, wind and temperature forecasts, and flight path intent information to name a few [4]. These factors have been the subject of many scientific studies. In [5], the National Airspace Space Administration (NASA) ran aircraft field tests to verify the operational performance of its own TP. In a different study [6], researchers at the MITRE Corporation developed models to evaluate their DST’s overall performance by utilizing accuracy statistics of their TP’s performance. In yet another effort [7], a collaborative group of European and American researchers illustrated that the impact of variations in these factors has significant effects on the output trajectory’s accuracy.

Under present-day operations, as illustrated previously in Figure 1, the flight plan message is the typical means of coding the aircraft operator’s request and air traffic control’s clearance of the aircraft’s horizontal path. However, as the aircraft actually executes these maneuvers, unforeseen conditions such as the weather or the action of other aircraft, may impact the flight and require changes to the operation. These dynamic changes are currently not often processed the same by the automation systems on the ground and on-board the aircraft. As a result, these systems are often not synchronized with respect to aircraft information.

A common example is the heading vector. To safely avoid other aircraft ahead, the current procedure is initiated verbally through direct radio communications between pilot and ground controller. Either to add delay or spatial distance to the aircraft’s path, the air traffic controller instructs the aircraft pilot to deviate from the previously cleared flight plan to an alternate path. A specified heading is given for an indeterminate time or to capture a downstream position on the original flight plan. This information, although confirmed verbally between controller and pilot, is often not digitally transcribed for the automation on the ground. The result is aircraft predictions with missing lateral intent in the ground automation.

Heading vectors are not the only example of situations where ground automation lacks the horizontal clearances just issued to an aircraft. Flights may be verbally cleared to proceed direct to a downstream fix along its flight plan, presumably cutting time and distance off its overall route for improved efficiency and fuel savings. In the United States, MITRE Corporation published a study in 2000 that reported that only about 30% of the lateral maneuvers within an en route facility were entered into the ATM automation [8].

In other cases, the flight may be deviated to fly one or more hold maneuvers or parallel offset from the current route. This next example describes a flight entering a hold maneuver. An operational recording was made in March 2005 of a civilian airliner traveling through the United States’ Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC), referred to as ZDC. It originated from Dallas Fort Worth, Texas with the destination of John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in New York. Figure 2 illustrates the top down stereographic view of the aircraft’s horizontal path overlaid on the ZDC high-altitude sectors, which it travels through. On its journey to JFK, the sample flight is traveling in a northeasterly direction where ZDC accepts air traffic control for the flight at 20:14 UTC (Coordinated Universal Time) from adjacent Indianapolis ARTCC.

For completeness, Figure 3 illustrates the time versus altitude profile of the aircraft. It enters ZDC at Flight Level 390 (FL 390) and at approximately 20:29 UTC, the aircraft is cleared to descend to FL 380. It begins its descent to FL 380 about two minutes later. It then receives a series of descent clearances and is handed-off to New York ARTCC at 20:56 UTC during a brief cruising segment at FL 240.
complete hold maneuver performed later in the flight beginning roughly at 20:50 UTC. Clearly, the trajectory does not reflect this event, which is suspected to be a result of a verbal air traffic control clearance not entered into the automation system. An extraction of the trajectory metrics calculated for the 74005 second trajectory is listed in Table I. A sample was taken at 74040 seconds (20:34:00) with a look-ahead time every five minutes up to 20 minutes in the future. At the first measurement time at look-ahead time of zero, the horizontal error (i.e. straight-line unsigned error) was nearly half a mile with zero vertical error. However, as the look-ahead time progresses and approaches the turn as depicted in close-up view in Figure 4, the horizontal errors increased significantly. Due to the missed maneuver, the error reaches up to 32 nautical miles horizontally. The clearly visible cross-track error (i.e. side-to-side lateral error) is approximately 12 nautical miles, but the bulk of the error is found in the along-track error (i.e. longitudinal or along the route error). The additional travel time caused by the hold maneuver manifests in a -32 nautical mile along-track error, which translates to as much as 4.4 minutes lag in the trajectory prediction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement Time</th>
<th>Look-Ahead Time</th>
<th>Horizontal Error</th>
<th>Cross-track Error</th>
<th>Along-track Error</th>
<th>Vertical Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HH:MM:SS</td>
<td>Seconds</td>
<td>Nautical Miles</td>
<td>Nautical Miles</td>
<td>Nautical Miles</td>
<td>Feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:34:00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:39:00</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:44:00</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:49:00</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:54:00</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>-32.5</td>
<td>6952</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. LATERAL DEVIATION METRICS

As described in the previous section, missing lateral intent data is often the result of various maneuvers being initiated without proper updates to the TP (typically located in the ground automation system utilized by DSTs). This error can be detected in post processing or even operationally by measuring the difference between the automation’s known horizontal position and the coincident surveillance position. In a study conducted in [9] and in another in [10], the overall adherence to the current air traffic control clearance is defined as the status of whether the aircraft is following its known clearance at each instance of time during its flight. As with any definition, this definition is subject to interpretation, but focusing only on the lateral dimension discussed in [10], it is interpreted to mean that the surveillance radar position (or global positioning satellite position if available) for an aircraft should be declared out of lateral adherence when it is determined that the aircraft’s intent was to deviate laterally from its known cleared route.

Figure 5 shows the geometry associated with determining lateral adherence of a surveillance data point for an aircraft. The figure shows an aircraft at a specific position and flying along a path in a specific direction. The figure also shows the current route segment for the aircraft with a triangle depicting the next fix on this route. Identified in this figure are five metrics that can be used to define whether or not an aircraft is in lateral adherence at a specific position. The five metrics are:

1. $\alpha$ - The angle between a line drawn from the aircraft's actual position point to the next fix and a line coincident with the aircraft's current route segment.

2. $\beta$ - The angle between the aircraft's direction of flight and a line drawn from the aircraft's actual position point to the next fix. (This will be referred to as bearing to the next fix in this paper although an aircraft’s direction of flight may not be equal to its heading.)

3. $d_a$ - The distance along the route to the next fix measured from a point normally projected from the aircraft's actual position point onto the aircraft's current route segment.

4. $d_n$ - The straight line distance between the aircraft's actual position point and the next fix.

5. $d_r$ - The normal distance from the aircraft's actual position point to the aircraft's current route segment.
Based on the geometry depicted in Figure 5, the actual position of an aircraft would be considered to be in “perfect” lateral adherence when all of the following four conditions are true: \( \alpha \), \( \beta \), and \( d_r \) are equal to zero and \( d_a \) equals \( d_n \).

![Figure 5. Geometry of Lateral Deviation – Adapted from [10]](image)

Although the calculation of all five metrics completely and accurately defines the lateral geometry involved, it is proposed that only two are actually necessary to adequately determine if an aircraft is laterally deviating from its route. If a combination of the normal distance, \( d_n \), and the angle \( \beta \) are within certain predetermined thresholds, it could be stated that the aircraft is in lateral adherence to the current known route.

Even though these metrics and their measured distributions are universal, the combinations of thresholds chosen to determine if an aircraft is in a state of lateral adherence are truly dependent on the DST application being supported. For this paper, the thresholds chosen in and described in [11] to support a non-operational conflict probe will be used. Furthermore, a heuristic method was implemented in [11] to determine if the DST’s TP should utilize the flight plan or base its prediction strictly on course heading information from radar surveillance data. This heuristic approach provides descriptive states of lateral adherence and non-adherence that can be utilized to quantify operational data.

The heuristic algorithm is illustrated in the following Figure 6. It begins by calculating the normal distance to the route, \( d_n \) (or simply the lateral deviation) and the angle \( \beta \) to the next fix position on the route. If at the end of the route, immediately end the calculation and label the state, \( \text{endOfRoute} \). This is an indeterminate case when the aircraft has gone past the end of the flight plan route and thus lateral intent is unknown. If not at the end of the route, the lateral deviation is checked and if below a threshold, \( D_1 \), is labeled to be in a state of \( \text{innerInConf} \). If the lateral deviation is larger than the threshold \( D_1 \), then it is checked against a larger threshold \( D_2 \). If it exceeds this threshold, it is labeled \( \text{outerNonConf} \) for the first out of lateral conformance state. If the lateral deviation is below, both the lateral deviation and angle \( \beta \) are checked against thresholds \( D_1 \) and \( P_1 \), respectively. If both measures are below there respective threshold, the state is labeled \( \text{midInConf} \) for the last in conformance state or not as \( \text{midNonConf} \) as the last out of conformance state. The thresholds used in this paper are listed in the following Table II.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threshold</th>
<th>Value (units)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( D_1 )</td>
<td>0.5 (nm)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( D_2 )</td>
<td>1.5 (nm)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( D_3 )</td>
<td>1.0 (nm)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( P_1 )</td>
<td>30 (deg)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Figure 6. Lateral Adherence Heuristic States](image)

V. LATERAL INTENT RESULTS ON OPERATIONAL DATA

The late professor and modern management theory pioneer, Peter F. Drucker, is attributed with the famous quote, “If you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it.” Following this advice in perspective of the TP, intent, and deviation information subsequently presented, the previously described metrics are applied to a large set of operational data from the United States, Australia, and Europe. This section provides a guide to the magnitude of the error in various contexts on the ground and in the air. For the ground automation data, it also includes an analysis of aircraft conflict predictions.
A. Lateral Deviation Results for Ground-Based Automation

This paper utilizes United States air traffic data collected for a recent study in [11]. It includes seven hours of air traffic messages, amounting to approximately 50,000 flights, and associated adaptation (i.e., detailed definitions of airspace boundaries and fix locations for expanding the flight plans) collected on April 3, 2008 for all twenty en route ARTCCs within the continental United States. The air traffic messages were retrieved from the Host Air Traffic Management Data Distribution System (HADDS). The messages record each ARTCC’s air traffic control clearances and surveillance radar track positions. Next, the messages are parsed and planned routes are expanded from the flight plan amendments into a series of geographic positions. The data sample captures the afternoon peak traffic schedule including the traffic messages recorded from 17:00:00 to 23:59:59 UTC (Coordinated Universal Time). The selected expanded routes and associated surveillance radar positions are the input data source for generating the lateral intent error metrics defined in Section IV. Table III provides the listing of ARTCC code versus location and the flight count per sample.

For the European data discussed in this paper, the statistics are cited from the EUROCONTROL’s Flight Data Management Metrics project, published in [12]. The project’s objective is to measure the quality of flight data available to stakeholders, including data consistency, accuracy and other measures. The data set represents a large European flight sample collected for one day in November 2006. Approximately 27,000 flights from EUROCONTROL’s Central Flow Management Unit were supplied by 31 European Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) across Europe [12].

![Table III. U.S. ARTCC Codes & Flight Count](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARTCC Code</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Sample Flight Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ZAB</td>
<td>Albuquerque</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAU</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>3163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZBW</td>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>1915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZDC</td>
<td>Wash DC</td>
<td>3348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZDV</td>
<td>Denver</td>
<td>2157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZFW</td>
<td>Fort Worth</td>
<td>2570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZHU</td>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>2617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZID</td>
<td>Indianapolis</td>
<td>2946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZJX</td>
<td>Jacksonville</td>
<td>3074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZKC</td>
<td>Kansas City</td>
<td>2366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZLA</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>2586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZLC</td>
<td>Salt Lake City</td>
<td>1619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZMA</td>
<td>Miami</td>
<td>2138</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZME</td>
<td>Memphis</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZMP</td>
<td>Minneapolis</td>
<td>2228</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZNY</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>2597</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZOA</td>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td>1613</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZOB</td>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>3393</td>
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<td>ZSE</td>
<td>Seattle</td>
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<td>ZTL</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>50019</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Lateral Deviation Statistics

As cited in [12], the European data collection was conducted with the aid of the Eurocontrol Flight Information Consistency Analysis Tool (EFICAT). For the two-dimensional route analysis in [12], the field data was grouped into two categories: major lateral deviations from the route of 50 nautical miles and a minor category between 20 and 50 nautical miles. There were 27,300 measurements taken. Of them, 5,264 were determined to be minor deviations with an average lateral deviation from their flight plan of 30 nautical miles; 761 were cataloged as major deviations with an average lateral distance of 73 nautical miles. This translates to about 19% of the total flights having an average lateral deviation of 30 nautical miles and 3% with an average deviation of 73 nautical miles indicating that significant deviations do take place in the European airspace. The study correlated these deviations to route length changes which indicated routes were deviated to fly more direct routes for fuel and time savings.

For the United States data set, the lateral deviation between route and aircraft position, $d$, as defined in Section IV, was calculated for each ARTCC recording as described above for all the aircraft radar track positions within the associated ARTCC’s air traffic control. The result is a total of 8,111,087 measurements taken from about 50,000 flights. Table IV summarizes the results by ARTCC. The sample means ranged from about 1 to 7 nautical miles, however the medians (50th percentile) only ranged from -0.01 to 0.08 nautical miles.

The difference between the sample median and mean statistics indicates the heavy tailed nature of these distributions. The sample mean is substantially increased by the presence of large lateral deviations on the order of hundreds of nautical miles, while the median is typically unaffected. This observation is not uncommon. In [13], it was independently reported that large tails were present in the lateral measurements collected from flights off the West coast of the United States in Oakland Oceanic and ZLA. In the same paper, a parametric model was successfully fit to the measurements that described two distinct events occurring. Interestingly, it showed some measurements were simply effected by typical deviations from centerline of an aircraft’s intended route, while others (large deviations in the tails) were generated by atypical events where aircraft changed route and the automation lacked the updated information.

A reasonable indicator of the magnitude of the typical error behavior described above is the interquartile range (IQR). IQR is the difference between the 75th and 25th percentiles as listed in Table IV. By definition, IQR contains 50% of the distribution. For all 20 ARTCCs, the IQR was on average about 1.4 nautical miles. This is in contrast to the much larger standard deviation which captures both the typical and atypical behavior because it quantifies the entire spread of the distribution. In this case, it captures both the large deviations from the heavy tails and the typical behavior near the center. For this data sample, the standard deviation and IQR are poorly correlated further justifying this claim. Thus, ARTCCs with large standard deviations may not have large IQRs and vice versa.
Cluster analysis is the classification of similar objects into groups [14-15]. For this data set, the 20 ARTCCs are clustered into similar groups in terms of the standard deviation and IQR statistics. This allows us to select a subset of data for detailed analysis to infer claims about a group of ARTCCs. More importantly, it may indicate some common characteristics of clusters associated to the lateral intent process. Lateral intent is one of many input sources for a TP, but it does play a key role as described in Section II and may predict the overall performance of a DST’s performance. Graphically, Figure 7 illustrates a two dimensional bubble plot with y-axis in terms of standard deviation and x-axis in terms of IQR statistic. The bubble’s size is proportional to the sample size from Table IV and the three colors denote the three identified clusters.

There are many mathematical approaches in determining the clusters for continuous data [14-16]. Hierarchical clustering divides the data in a successive number of steps where at each step the number of clusters increases until all the data remains in a single group. Utilizing JMP© statistical software package, Ward’s minimum variance technique is applied here to produce a number of clusters [16]. Figure 8 provides a graphic representation of the results of this technique. This type of figure is called a denogram. It represents a horizontal tree structure with single points as leaves, the final single cluster as the trunk, and the intermediate clusters as branches. The cluster and color coding in Figure 8 is logically consistent with the illustration in Figure 7.

As shown in Figure 9, the red cluster of ARTCCs (the cluster with the lowest standard deviation) is concentrated in the East coast of the United States. Interestingly, also in the east coast, Miami ARTCC (ZMA) represents the lone cluster with both the largest standard deviation and IQR relative to the other ARTCCs. There could be a number of reasons for this result. Convective or some other severe weather on this particular day could have caused increased reroutes in some areas of the country. The nature of operations and composition of the airspace may play a role in differentiating some facilities or matching them. ZMA in particular may be affected by oceanic traffic from the Atlantic and Caribbean and the limitations of radar coverage over these areas.

Table IV. Lateral Deviation Statistics by ARTCC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Source</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Percentiles (nm)</th>
<th>Mean (nm)</th>
<th>Std Dev (nm)</th>
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</thead>
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<td>490275</td>
<td>-0.267 0.063 0.765</td>
<td>3.770 29.597</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZFW</td>
<td>384097</td>
<td>-0.809 0.039 0.951</td>
<td>1.266 12.797</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZHU</td>
<td>421271</td>
<td>-0.607 0.045 0.890</td>
<td>2.151 20.797</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ZID</td>
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<td>-0.376 0.059 0.671</td>
<td>1.371 10.867</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIX</td>
<td>540701</td>
<td>-0.714 0.056 1.100</td>
<td>1.361 11.486</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZKC</td>
<td>443290</td>
<td>-0.571 0.041 0.977</td>
<td>2.943 24.252</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZLA</td>
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<td>5.652 26.665</td>
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<td>ZLC</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZTL</td>
<td>566839</td>
<td>-0.535 0.048 0.820</td>
<td>1.734 13.964</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in Figure 9, the red cluster of ARTCCs (the cluster with the lowest standard deviation) is concentrated in the East coast of the United States. Interestingly, also in the east coast, Miami ARTCC (ZMA) represents the lone cluster with both the largest standard deviation and IQR relative to the other ARTCCs. There could be a number of reasons for this result. Convective or some other severe weather on this particular day could have caused increased reroutes in some areas of the country. The nature of operations and composition of the airspace may play a role in differentiating some facilities or matching them. ZMA in particular may be affected by oceanic traffic from the Atlantic and Caribbean and the limitations of radar coverage over these areas.
a series of fix positions and airways. Some of these positions along the route represent turns. More frequent turns in theory may correlate to increased lateral deviations. Aircraft in turns follow more variable arced paths versus straight paths on the rest of the trajectory. Thus, measurements were calculated quantifying the fraction of turn fixes (positions on the flight plan route which formed a turn greater than 30 degrees) compared to the total number of fixes for each ARTCC. The results for our 20 ARTCC sample ranged from 11% to 21%, where the largest was indeed ZMA. However, overall the values did not align with the defined clusters or correlate to a significant degree to the standard deviation or IQR. Between these two statistics, they were slightly more correlated to the IQR values. Since IQR is postulated to be a better estimate of the typical lateral deviation and not a change in route itself, the result is consistent.

It was also postulated that if more amendments were entered, then it would be more likely to capture the lateral intent and lower the resulting errors. To test this, the average number of unique route amendments recorded per flight per ARTCC was calculated. It ranged from approximately 3 to 11 routes per flight with an average of 5 for all ARTCCs. However, the results indicated no correlation to the standard deviation and IQR metrics. Also, there seemed to be no noticeable relationship to the clusters identified. Thus, if amendments have an effect, it is the non-recorded variety that is the suspected cause for the errors being measured in this paper.

Convective weather could play a role on the number of reroutes and thus could influence the lateral intent. Figure 10 illustrates a weather map for the same date of the traffic recording, downloaded from the United States National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration [17]. It shows the precipitation areas and amounts in North America during the 24 hours ending at 1200 UTC, with amounts to the nearest hundredth of an inch. From the shading, ZMA did have significant precipitation during the sample date, yet so did other ARTCCs in the southern part of the country and some in the Midwest as well as the west coast.

ZID, ZMA, and ZMP ARTCCs were selected from each of the three clusters and a detailed comparison of their lateral distributions was performed. This is illustrated in Figure 11. A box plot is depicted that illustrates the spread of the data. The green histograms also portray the spread with height proportional to frequency. The inner red box represents the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles and extending lines referred to as whiskers are 1.5 times the IQR values (length of the box). The blue lines are the mean values. It is clear from the Figure 11 that ZMA has significantly more variability than the other two ARTCCs with ZID having the lowest in terms of total spread, IQR and mean.

Figure 11. Detailed View on Selected ARTCCs

2) Lateral Adherence State Statistics

Lateral adherence states were defined in Section IV. Figure 12 illustrates the relative frequencies of each adherence state for a subset of ARTCCs. It presents the three selected ARTCC’s ZID, ZMP, and ZMA. As shown earlier, the ZMA contains the largest amount of lateral deviation with 58% of the measurements out of conformance overall (i.e. sum of outerNonConf and midNonConf measurements), while ZID has only 34% out of conformance, and ZMP 41%.

These states are intended to provide guidance on the current state of the aircraft in terms of conformance to its current route of flight. The thresholds were already presented in Table II in Section IV. These thresholds ensure that aircraft are labeled in conformance are laterally within one nautical mile of their route. Based on the results reported in Table IV, this corresponds to about the average IQR. This lateral adherence results are useful in [11] to determine the type of TP algorithm to apply. In the next section, it is very useful to quantify the impact of lateral deviations on conflict prediction.
The methodology to determine the rates of missed and false alert events from the sample recording. For this study, the technique was applied on a flight plan based CP originally developed in [11] and run on a sample scenario taken from Indianapolis ARTCC (ZID).

The sample contains four hours of time-shifted traffic data, amounting to approximately 1100 flights with 139 test conflict pairs for the CP to detect. The overall missed, false, and correct or valid alert quantities are as follows:

- 98 events were valid alerts (VA)
- 41 events were missed alerts (MA)
- 903 events were false alerts (FA)

The overall performance reported is slightly larger than normal because aircraft deviating significantly from the route are normally excluded from the error event counts for strategic or intent based CPs [19-20]. However, this particular study’s objective is to quantify the impact of lateral intent errors so excluding them would not allow their measurement.

To evaluate whether lateral deviations influence the CP’s accuracy performance, the analysis first examined the two sets of conflict events: those that were correctly predicted (VAs) and those that were missed (MAs). The analysis focused first on the distribution of maximum lateral deviation distance at the start of the conflict for these two sets of data for each of the flight pairs in conflict. However, each event was further partitioned by the reason category in which there are four. A missed alert is an error if no alert was present at all at the actual conflict start time. This was labeled as “NO_CALL MA”. The alternative is the CP did present an alert but within a threshold (five minutes for this study) time of the conflict start time. This is labeled as “LATE_MA”. The valid alerts had the remaining two sub-cases. If the alert is presented before the conflict start time but again within the threshold time (same five minutes value as above) yet had a verified reason for being late, its labeled “LATE_VA”. These late valid alerts are artifacts of the testing environment, such as a conflict that begins at the start of the traffic sample or within a threshold of a recorded clearance event. These conflicts are considered “pop-up” events and the timeliness requirement is relaxed only for them. The remaining VA events are the standard correct alerts that were correctly matched to a conflict and had the required warning time. These are labeled “STD VA”.

Figure 13 displays the statistical box plot (in red), mean and standard deviation (in blue) for the four categories of VA and MA events. The late VA events and the no-call MA events had the largest lateral deviations indicating the possible impact lateral deviation has on the CP. Most notably was the contrast of the no-call MA events to the others. The no-call MA had a sample mean of about 19 nautical miles and a standard deviation of 41 nautical miles, while the standard VA was almost half the size at 11 and 20 nautical miles, respectively.
Like the MA versus VA analysis above, a false alert (FA) analysis was performed as well. The total set of VA events has a lateral deviation mean and standard deviation of 11 and 17 nautical miles contrasted to the FA events of 18 and 29 nautical miles. As illustrated in Figure 14, the IQR (height of the box) is significantly larger for FA events compare the VA events as well. This provides evidence to support the hypothesis that false alert predictions are induced in part to the lateral deviations of the aircraft the CP is processing.

Next, a categorical statistical analysis was performed by first generating a 2 by 2 contingency table, illustrated in Table V. The table partitions conflict events by their lateral adherence state and whether the event was predicted (alert or no alert) by the CP. These alert counts represent the VA and MA events partitioned by their lateral adherence state at the conflict start time. If either flight of the conflict pair was in a state of out of adherence as defined in Section IV, then the conflict event was labeled “Out” and less for “In” adherence. Of the total 98 alert events (VAs) 38 were “In” and 60 were “Out”. In contrast, the 41 conflicts without alerts (MAs) had 14 that were “In” and 27 were “Out”. If the lateral deviations classified by lateral adherence state did not impact the CP’s conflict predictions, then the ratio of alerts and non-alerts (VA and MAs) would be the same for both subsets of true conflicts. This can be tested statistically as defined in [22-23] and expressed in (1) by calculating the ratio of the squared difference between the expected value of each count and the observed value. If the hypothesis is true, this ratio will follow a chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom. The expected value is calculated by determining the proportion of total conflicts events by the ratio of alert events. For example, the expected VA count is calculated by multiplying the proportion of total conflicts that were in adherence (52 from Table V) by the total ratio of VA events (98/139). This results in 37 and listed in the upper right corner cell in Table V. Thus, application of (1) to all values in Table V produces a p-value larger than 0.1, and thus the hypothesis cannot be rejected that the number of MA events are not correlated to an out of adherence state at 0.1 significance level.

The test statistic is \( \chi^2 \), defined as follows:

\[
\chi^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{4} \frac{(O_i - E_i)^2}{E_i}
\]

Where,

- \( O_i \) is the observed frequency in category \( i \)
- \( E_i \) is the expected frequency in category \( i \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alert State</th>
<th>Conflict Event Counts For Each Lateral Adherence State</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alert</td>
<td>In 37 Out 61</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Alert</td>
<td>In 15 Out 26</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \chi^2 = 0.265, \text{df}=1; \text{p-value}=0.607 \)

Table VI illustrates the opposite result for the analogous encounter events (non-conflict) and associated alerts (FAs). The result indicates that more encounter events are alerted than expected for the proportion of encounters that were labeled “Out” and less for “In” adherence. Thus, there is statistical evidence with a p-value near zero to reject the hypothesis that FA events are not affected by lateral adherence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alert State</th>
<th>Encounter Event Counts For Each Lateral Adherence State</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alert</td>
<td>In 175 Out 514</td>
<td>689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Alert</td>
<td>In 1993 Out 2401</td>
<td>4394</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \chi^2 = 128.22, \text{df}=1; \text{p-value}=0.000 \)
One additional analysis was performed on the FA events. A unitless ratio called the min-max ratio was calculated for all non-conflict encounter events and matched to the associated FA events. The min-max ratio is defined in detail in [18]. To summarize, the maximum ratio between horizontal separation and the horizontal separation standard (e.g., 5 nautical miles) and the vertical separation and vertical standard (e.g., 1000 feet) is calculated for each time coincident surveillance position between the aircraft of the encounter. The minimum of all values represents the minimum distance in both dimensions the aircraft pair were separated. Also, if the ratio is less than one, the encounter would be a conflict event. The min-max ratio provides a guide to how close the aircraft came in terms of the separation standards and combines both horizontal and vertical dimensions into one parameter.

For the Figure 15 below, the total number of encounters between each 0.5 min-max ratio starting at 1 was calculated and the associated FA events as well. The fractions of associated FA events to the total encounters per bin were calculated. In Figure 15, the results are plotted with the y-axis as the fraction (estimate of probably of alerts for the bin) and the x-axis is the min-max ratio from 1 to 5.5. The figure’s fit curves are power series best fits for these data points. The slope of the curve is proportional to the overall sensitivity of the CP to the separation of the encounters it is predicting and the area is roughly equal to the total false alert probability.

Figure 15 fit three curves. The green square labeled curve represents the predictions for alerts that are in lateral adherence at notification time. The red triangle labeled curve is for the out of adherence version and the curve with blue circles represents all the alerts, both in and out of adherence. It is clearly shown that the steepest curve is the in adherence version and least is the out of adherence version with the all curve in between. This gives a good indication that lateral adherence affects the overall sensitivity and thus performance of the CP. It provides direct empirical evidence on the impact of lateral adherence on conflict prediction.

![Figure 15. False Alert Probability Curves for Lateral Adherence State](image)

**B. Lateral Deviation Results from Airborne Automation**

As envisioned by the JPDO, SESAR, and Australian ATM Strategic planners to some degree, the large lateral errors described in this paper for the ground-based automation systems in both the American and European airspaces have relatively near term solutions. Specifically, an alternate approach to aviation automation both air and ground is to exchange trajectory information constructed and contained within the aircraft’s Flight Management System (FMS) computer then utilize this data in the ground system TP. The impact as presented in the CP, described in this paper, is just one example of many of the potential improvement opportunities.

One currently available source of aircraft derived trajectory information is the Automatic Dependent Surveillance Contract (ADS-C). ADS-C is a dependent form of surveillance in which a ground station initiates a contract (dynamic agreement) with an aircraft such that the aircraft will automatically report information obtained from its onboard equipment according to conditions specified in the contract. A Future Air Navigation System (FANS) equipped aircraft can have up to four specific contracts with individual ground stations plus a contract with the Airline Operations Center (AOC).

The current positions in the ADS-C data is based on very precise (relative to ground based radar reports) Global Satellite System (GPS) position reports, and the route positions are the exactly what the guidance system within the aircraft’s FMS is currently flying to. Like the ground based counterpart presented in the previous sections, lateral deviations between the current ADS-C positions and route positions were calculated from two different sources. This section will report on the lateral deviations supplied by Airservices Australia using data from Australian controlled airspace and similar data in the United States from the FAA’s Separation Standards Analysis Team from air traffic collected off the West coast of the United States.

ADS-C’s periodic contract specifies the reporting rate and what data groups are requested in each ADS Basic Periodic Report. The following groups can be requested:

- **Basic Group** containing current position, altitude and time.
- **Earth Reference Group** containing groundspeed, true track and vertical rate.
- **Air Reference Group** containing Mach number, true heading and vertical rate.
- **Meteorological Group** containing aircraft measured wind speed, wind direction and temperature.
- **Predicted Route Group (PRG)** containing a position and arrival time estimate for the next waypoint and a position estimate for the waypoint that follows.
- **Intermediate Projected Intent (IPI)** containing position and arrival time estimates for a maximum of ten trajectory change points (not necessary waypoints, e.g. Top of Descent) ahead of the aircraft.

Besides periodic contracts, there are event contracts and demand contracts. The event contract specifies that for a particular event (e.g. waypoint change event or altitude range deviation event) an ADS report needs to be down linked. The
demand contract is a one-time request for an additional Basic Periodic Report.

1) Australian ADS-C Lateral Deviations

The Australian ADS-C data extracted for this study was collected between February 2008 to January 2009 during the Tailored Arrivals trial performed by Airservices Australia and participating partners. The primary focus of the Tailored Arrivals research is to determine the accuracy and consistency of the aircraft’s intended trajectory provided by the Intermediate Projected Intent of the ADS Basic Periodic Report. To eliminate to the maximum extent possible external variables it is important for the onboard automation to fly the aircraft in FMS in both lateral and vertical navigation (i.e. LNAV and VNAV) control modes without human intervention.

The ADS-C data was obtained from flights arriving in the early morning, which due to the relative low traffic density were highly unlikely to be subject to air traffic control (ATC) intervention for the arrival. Coupled with the published runway linked Standard Terminal Arrival Routes at the destination, the trajectory of these aircraft can be stable in excess of two hours prior to destination. The consistency of processing these aircraft permits the extraction and analysis of intent data from these flights commencing two hours prior to destination. For consistent results the flight crew were issued with instructions to operate in both LNAV and VNAV modes and ATC were asked not to intervene unless absolutely necessary. The FMS and onboard automation was permitted to operate the aircraft as optimally as possible. Without ATC or pilot intervention the ADS-C position reports of these flights form a consistent and valid data set to analyze lateral deviations from the FMS intended track. The intended or planned track of the aircraft can be constructed from the PRG of the ADS Basic Periodic Report which is consistent with the ground based flight-planned track and actually includes any direct-to clearance programmed into the FMS.

To extract the data from these in service aircraft an unmanned duplicate ATC system was established to initiate ADS contracts specifically tailored to the data collection via a separate and additional ADS-C connection. The ADS contract for data collection purposes differed from the ATSP operational contract by an increased reporting rate at two minutes plus supply of all downloadable data. The high reporting frequency was required to analyze the accuracy and consistency of the Intermediate Projected Intent (IPI) over subsequent reports. During the two hour data extraction, at least 60 ADS-C Basic Periodic Reports were received per flight.

All ADS-C data used in this study were obtained from eastbound flights departing from Dubai and Singapore to Melbourne and Adelaide. Data extraction commenced when the aircraft was approximately two hours of destination, typically somewhere around 1000 nautical miles from destination. The flights were performed by Airbus A330-300, Airbus A340-500, Boeing 747-400 and Boeing 777-300 aircraft (all Honeywell FMS). The data included a total of 778 flights with an average of 34.4 reports per flight. The following lists the break down of flights per aircraft type:

- There were 58 flights of type Airbus A330-300.
- There were 168 flights of type Airbus A340-500.
- There were 258 flights of type Boeing 747-400.
- There were 294 flights of type Boeing 777-300.

As listed in the Table VII in row labeled A.A., a total of 26,731 ADS-C position reports were analyzed and processed for lateral deviation between the ADS-C Basic Group current position and properly matched the previous PRG next and next plus one route positions. Thus, the lateral deviation is calculated between the aircraft’s precise GPS position to the aircraft’s matched current FMS known route segment. The results are tremendously accurate compared to the ground-based version reported on in Table IV. The standard deviation and IQR are approximately 800 and 40 times smaller than the U.S. ground-based data results. Translated to feet, the standard deviation amounts to approximately 160 feet and IQR about 200 feet. The histogram depicted the distribution of these errors is illustrated in Figure 16. It forms a fairly symmetric distribution about the slightly negative mean and sharply peaked like previous studies [13].

![Figure 16. Histogram of Lateral Deviations of Australian ADS-C Data](image)

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1Operating optimally in this context means operating to a flight-specific Cost Index (CI) determined by the AOC to achieve maximum efficiency in overall network operations.

2For purposes of this study it is preferred to construct the reference track from which to determine the lateral deviation from the PRG over the IPI, in contrast to the fixed position of the waypoints in the PRG.

3The position estimates of the trajectory change points in the IPI are given by bearing and distances from the aircraft’s current position. The subsequent dynamic conversion to latitude and longitude causes these positions to vary per ADS report. This variation directly influences the lateral deviation as determined with respect to the IPI track.
The results are summarized in Table VII within the table row labeled 

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Airspace Source</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>25th Percentiles (nm)</th>
<th>50th Percentiles (nm)</th>
<th>75th Percentiles (nm)</th>
<th>Mean (nm)</th>
<th>Std Dev (nm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States Airspace: ADS-C Data</td>
<td>39012</td>
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<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Airspace: ADS-C Data</td>
<td>26731</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

TABLE VII. AIRBORNE LATERAL DEVIATION STATISTICS

2) American ADS-C Lateral Deviations

A separate analysis of ADS-C lateral deviations was conducted in 2007 by the FAA’s Separation Standards Analysis Team from air traffic collected off the West coast of the United States. The detailed results are published in [13]. The results are summarized in Table VII within the table row labeled U.S. Like the Australian results, the performance is orders of magnitude larger than the ground based version. The sample standard deviation is over 100 times smaller than the ARTCC results, and the IQR is as much as 60 times smaller as well. In units of feet, the standard deviation and IQR translate to about 1100 and 150 feet, respectively. The detailed study in [13] not only reports on descriptive statistics but fits the distribution of errors to a specific parametric model. This model is the beyond the scope of this paper, but indicates that the errors being studied can be mathematically modeled and utilized for simulation experiments of a future ATM system where synchronization of these data sources can be studied further.

Comparing the two sources of ADS-C results indicate some of the differences between the two samples. The Australian data was collected on a sub-set of flights and ATC intervention was purposely excluded by the study or removed in analysis. Additionally, pilots were restricted in the FMS mode of operation they could use for the flights. Thus, large deviations due to changes in the ATC cleared flight plan were typically not present in the Australian data set. For the United States version, the data was collected for 105 days between January and early June of 2007. The data consisted of trans-oceanic flights leaving Oakland oceanic ATC control center and entering the west coast airspace of ZLA (Los Angeles ARTCC). The data was not purposely filtered for ATC deviations or coordinated beyond the normal operational ADS-C process. Thus, the larger difference between IQR and standard deviation in the United States data and in general larger standard deviation indicates that these outlier events most likely did occur and increased the variance to several times the quantity measured in Australia. However, both ADS-C data sets provide strong evidence of the tremendous improvement in the form of lateral accuracy compared to the ground based versions reported on in the United States and Europe.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

Fostered by the broad next generation ATM initiatives from JPDO, SESAR, and Australia’s ATM Strategic Plan, the overall objective of this study was two fold: quantify the lateral deviations between known flight plan routes within the ground and air automation systems across the globe and second determine the impact of these errors on some of the DST functions required for ATC operations. The collaboration of American, European, and Australian researchers provides a broad international perspective and relevance to both the analysis and the source data collected.

Besides the need to collaborate for savings in resources, the particular problem being studied, error of lateral intent in our ATM automation system, is clearly a global issue for all ATSPs. The results from the large United States data collection of 50,000 flights and over eight million measurements reported a standard deviation of approximately 21 nautical miles. The European results sited from [12] reported an average lateral deviation of 30 nautical miles for 19% of the flight measurements taken from a broad data collection of about 27,000 flights across European airspace.

The ground-based results are contrasted with airborne FMS navigated route positions and GPS generated current positions collected using ADS-C. Data from both the United States and Australia reported lateral deviation errors 100 to 800 times smaller than the ground-based version. Australian ADS-C data as listed in Table VII had standard deviations of approximately 0.03 nautical miles which translates to less than 200 feet.

ATC personnel as defined in the broad ATM initiatives previously cited will need accurate DSTs to support the complex and safety critical operations they perform. The CP is a DST that directly supports the separation management function by notifying when two or more aircraft are predicted to violate separation standards (i.e. have a conflict) in the future. A flight plan or intent based CP was input a set of test scenarios with slightly altered field recordings of actual aircraft flights. About 140 test conflicts and 1100 flights were evaluated to determine if lateral adherence state had statistically significant impacts on the CP’s conflict predictions. For lateral deviations between zero and one nautical mile contrasted against events with larger deviations, the CP’s performance had indeed degraded when contrasting the laterally challenged events. For example, false alerts (errors in reporting a conflict will occur when it was not actually in conflict) were about 12% more likely if out of conformance and about 27% less likely if in conformance as compared to correct predictions of actual conflicts. Other results indicated marginal or inconclusive results for missed alert (not detecting a conflict that really occurs), but the overall sensitivity of the CP’s predictions as a function of the separation distance between aircraft was significant and illustrated in Figure 15.

Therefore, the large ground-based deviations reported and impact demonstrated on a CP tool show lateral deviations are a key source of error in our ground-based TP process, core to many of our DST functions. Synchronization with airborne data sources like ADS-C offer a reliable and tremendously accurate solution to improving the ground based predictions.
The next step is integration of these systems to provide the benefits proposed.

Overall, the international collaboration that took place to perform this study is the type of global cooperation that will be needed to address the challenging ATM problems faced by all nations and ATSps. The study reports on one aspect of the TP process highlighted in Section II. Vertical deviations, time based errors, and weather forecasts mark only a few that can continue to be studied in the same manner set forth in this paper.

REFERENCES


Mr. Paglione is a senior member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) and has numerous publications in the area of air traffic management automation, especially in the evaluation and testing of operational systems.

Ibrahim Bayraktutar graduated from Middle East Technical University, Turkey with a B.S. degree in Industrial Engineering in 1990. He obtained a M.S. degree in Systems Analysis in 1992 and a M.S. degree in Operations Research in 1993, both from Miami University, U.S.A.

He has been working for EUROCONTROL since 1994 participating in various areas regarding Air Traffic Management, specializing in Trajectory Prediction and Management. He is currently managing Trajectory Management Framework activities in the Operational Systems unit. He has several publications on Systems Analysis, Systems Dynamic Modelling and Trajectory Prediction/Management (e.g. Impact of Factors, Conditions and Metrics on Trajectory Prediction Accuracy with Stephanie Mondoloni, CSSI Inc. at FAA/EUROCONTROL R&D Seminar, Baltimore, U.S.A. in 2005)

Mr. Bayraktutar is the co-chair of EUROCONTROL-FAA Action Plan 16 on Common Trajectory Prediction Capability. He is also a member of ORSA (Operations Research Society of America).

Gerg McDonald commenced work as an Australian Air Traffic Controller in 1981. He obtained an associate diploma of applied science in Computing in 1993 and a degree in Computing in 1996, both from Monash University, Australia.
He has been working for Airservices Australia and its predecessors since 1981 in various roles including radar, non radar sectors plus tower and Search & Rescue. Since 1995 he has worked in an Operational Support role participating in various activities necessary to ensure Australian ATC is conducted efficiently and safely among which was the development of the Australian ATM Strategic Plan. He was the project manager for AUSOTS the Australian Flex Track initiative designed to deliver route efficiencies to airlines operating in the Australian Environment. He is currently managing the Tailored Arrivals Trial in Australia and examining the accuracy and possible ground system use of aircraft derived trajectory data. 

Mr. McDonald is Australian representative for EUROCONTROL-FAA Action Plan 16 on Common Trajectory Prediction Capability.

**Jesper Bronsvoort** is an Aerospace Engineer currently working with Airservices Australia as part of his postgraduate education in Aerospace Engineering at Delft University of Technology, the Netherlands. He holds a cum laude BSc. degree in Aerospace Engineering from Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands (2006).

In his postgraduate, he particularly focuses on the field of optimization of flight operations. He is currently performing research into the use of aircraft derived data to improve trajectory prediction for decision support tools.